Stephen Gross, Export Empire: German Soft Power in Southeastern Europe, 1890-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp xv+384. 5 figs. 1 map. 32 tabs. ISBN 9781107112254 Hbk. £64.99) by Tunçer, AC
Stephen	Gross,	Export	Empire:	German	Soft	Power	in	Southeastern	Europe,	1890-
1945	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2015.	Pp	xv+384.	5	figs.	1	map.	32	tabs.	ISBN	9781107112254	Hbk.	£64.99).		This	book	is	a	meticulous	historical	analysis	of	the	German	imperialism	in	the	Southeastern	Europe	from	1890s	to	1945.	At	its	centre	lies	the	argument	that	foreign	trade	was	an	instrument	of	soft	power	and	it	was	utilised	by	Germany	to	build	an	informal	empire	in	the	Southeastern	Europe.	In	this	regard	the	book	engages	in	conversation	with	some	of	the	old	theories	and	histories	of	imperialism	(such	as	J.	Gallagher	and	R.	Robinson	‘The	Imperialism	of	Free	Trade’,	Economic	History	Review,	6,	no.	1		(1953),	pp.1-15;	A.	Hirschman,	
National	Power	and	the	Structure	of	Foreign	Trade,	Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press	(1945)).	By	examining	German	imperialism	during	1890-1945,	the	book	links	the	questions	of	empire,	imperialism	and	economic	development	together.	Besides	contributing	to	the	historiographies	of	the	Southeastern	Europe	and	German	imperialism,	Gross	offers	a	more	nuanced	interpretation	of	soft	and	hard	power	by	interacting	them	with	different	types	of	empires	(informal	and	formal)	in	a	“matrix	of	power”	(p.8).	He	then	applies	this	conceptual	framework	to	a	highly	controversial	episode	of	German	history	in	Europe.	The	book	is	chronologically	structured	and	it	consists	of	two	main	parts.	Part	1	focuses	on	the	period	from	1890s	to	1933	and	examines	the	rise	of	German	soft	power	in	the	Southeastern	Europe	through	the	lenses	of	economy,	politics	and	culture.	Part	2	focuses	on	the	Nazi	imperialism	and	the	transformation	of	German	imperial	influence	in	the	region.	It	evaluates	the	themes	of	commercial	networks,	cultural	diplomacy,	development	aid,	and	the	World	War	II.	The	first	part	of	the	book	starts	with	the	observation	that	German	foreign	policy	elites	began	to	look	back	to	Europe	instead	of	Africa	following	the	Moroccan	crisis	of	1911.	In	line	with	this	regional	shift,	policymakers	demanded	more	resources	to	improve	the	army	at	the	expense	of	the	navy.	This	process	was	also	accompanied	by	creating	incentives	for	German	migrants	to	settle	and	trade	in	the	Southeastern	Europe	in	order	to	exert	more	influence	in	the	region.	In	parallel,	German	elites	pursued	an	agenda	of	cultural	diplomacy	with	the	help	of	transnational	networks	and	institutions.	These	non-state	actors,	by	acquiring	market	information	and	building	trust	within	the	merchant	community,	contributed	to	the	emergence	of	a	German	informal	empire	in	the	Southeastern	Europe.	Although	the	World	War	I	brought	to	a	halt	this	liberal	imperialist	vision	of	an	informal	empire,	the	idea	re-emerged	in	the	second	half	of	the	1920s.	The	study	provides	a	wide	range	of	convincing	evidence	that	between	1925	and	1931	German	elites	began	to	create	new	institutions	to	promote	trade	interests	in	the	region.	This	focus	on	the	Southeastern	Europe	was	partly	driven	by	the	emergence	of	a	new	international	society	following	the	World	War	I.	As	opposed	to	the	internationalism	of	France,	Britain	and	America,	Germany	aimed	to	forge	regional	links	through	cultural	diplomacy	and	planted	the	seed	for	a	German	economic	bloc	centred	in	the	Central	and	Southeastern	Europe,	a	process	which	was	reinforced	also	by	the	Great	Depression	of	1929.		The	second	part	of	the	book	focuses	on	the	Nazi	imperialism	and	the	Third	Reich’s	relationship	with	the	Southeastern	Europe.	Gross	maintains	that	during	this	period	Germany	aimed	to	stabilise	trade	with	the	region	by	relying	
on	the	non-state	institutions	of	1920s.		This	not	only	helped	Germany	to	acquire	the	raw	materials	that	were	needed	for	its	industries	(the	so-called	“supply	effect”),	but	it	also	gave	way	to	the	economic	dependency	of	the	Balkan	states	to	Germany	(i.e.	“influence	effect”).	Similar	to	the	previous	era,	this	rapid	increase	in	trade	was	accompanied	by	cultural	diplomacy	to	convince	the	Balkan	elites	that	German	policies	towards	the	region	were	legitimate.	In	establishing	such	legitimacy,	the	author	emphasises	the	role	of	anti-Semitism,	as	German	elites	claimed	that	driving	Jews	out	of	the	economic	life	would	accelerate	economic	development	in	the	Balkans.	Unlike	the	previous	episode,	however,	an	important	dimension	of	the	Third	Reich’s	imperial	ambition	in	the	Balkans	were	development	programs	aimed	at	increasing	the	purchasing	power	of	the	region.	Gross	points	out	that	the	development	programs	put	forward	for	the	Balkan	states	helped	advance	the	military	ambitions	of	the	Third	Reich	by	making	the	Southeastern	Europe	a	more	effective	and	stable	supply	source	for	German	military	industries	during	1939-41.	This	part	concludes	-perhaps	rather	ex	post-	that	German	imperial	policies	in	the	Southeastern	Europe,	despite	their	diversity	and	flexibility,	were	simply	counterproductive,	and	by	the	middle	of	the	war,	the	region	became	economically	a	burden	for	the	Third	Reich.	Perhaps	one	of	the	understated	points	in	the	book	is	the	role	of	the	international	capital	flows	and	monetary	blocs	in	building	the	“export	empire”.	Although	Gross	makes	several	observations	about	financial	links	and	international	financial	control	organisations	in	the	region,	it	would	be	interesting	to	explore	the	extent	to	which	they	complemented	international	trade	as	alternative	forms	of	imperial	power.	Another	point,	which	has	limited	appearance	in	the	book,	is	the	importance	of	the	links	between	German	informal	empire	in	the	Southeastern	Europe	and	broader	imperial	power	struggle	in	the	Middle	East.	This	could	be	an	especially	exciting	avenue	to	follow	for	future	research	given	that	diplomatic	and	economic	ties	of	Germany	with	Turkey	(and	the	Ottoman	Empire)	remained	strong	until	the	end	of	the	World	War	II.			Overall,	this	is	an	extremely	valuable	book	for	economic	historians	as	it	underlines	that	the	study	of	international	trade	and	economic	development	cannot	be	separated	from	the	broader	power	struggle	during	1890-1945.	In	doing	so,	the	book	sheds	light	on	the	previously	unknown	mechanisms	that	contributed	to	the	rise	of	German	empire	at	the	heart	of	Europe,	a	process	which	eventually	led	to	the	World	War	II.	In	this	regard,	it	is	likely	to	remain	a	key	reference	work	for	years	to	come	on	German	imperial	and	economic	history.		
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